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German Equal Protection:
Economic Measures
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Review
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By Edward J. Eberle*
"Denn nur durch Vergleichung unterscheidet man sich
und erfdihrt, was man ist, um ganz zu werden, was man
sein soll." - Thomas Mann**

A. Introduction
David Currie devoted a substantial part of his scholarly work to exploring the
intricacies of constitutional law, focusing intently on the United States and German
constitutional orders. Along with Donald Kommers, Currie was among the first to
closely examine the German constitutional system in a search for elucidation. As
the quote by Thomas Mann (which he used in his seminal book, The Constitution of
the Federal Republic of Germany) illustrates, if we truly want to aspire to realize our
talents and ambitions, it is important to look outside national borders to see how
things are done elsewhere to discover if there are ways in which we can improve.
Staying within the "City upon a Hill,"' as many Americans identify the United
States, may lead to insularity or, even, a sense of false confidence. Which is why
the task of comparative law is so important: looking outside national borders to see
what other perspectives are out there, and then comparing and contrasting the
foreign and domestic to learn which, upon consideration, is better or worse and for
what reasons.
*Distinguished Research Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law. Copyright by
Edward J. Eberle, 2007. All rights reserved. All translations are mine unless otherwise noted. Email:
eeberle@rwu.edu.
" For only by making comparisons can we distinguish ourselves from others and discover who we are,
in order to become all that we are meant to be." THOMAS MANN, JOSEPH IN AEGYPTEN (1933) (quoted
and translated in DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (1994)).
'John Winthrop, The City Upon a Hill; the Covenant; The Nenw Israel and the Separated Garden, Sermon on
Christian Charity (1630), in RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, HISTORY, CASES, AND OTHER MATERIALS ON THE
INTERACTION OF RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT 122-23 (John Noonan, Jr. and Edward McGlynn Gaffney,
Jr. eds., 2001).
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That is what David Currie did in his work, focusing on the German constitutional
order in comparison to the American in a search for illumination and perspective.
Currie observed a number of notable differences between the two systems. These
included the idea of positive as well as negative rights. 2 Negative rights, of course,
mean a fount of personal freedoms that individuals can exercise to delimit state
power. Both the United States and Germany share this conception of rights. A
difference in the two constitutional orders, however, is that the German system
contains a positive dimension to rights as well, obliging the state to act proactively
to protect its citizens. In substantial part, this idea is grounded in the Sozialstaat
(social justice) principle of article 20(1) of the German Grundgesetz (GG - Basic
3
Law), which obligates the state to provide a measure of social justice for all people.
The commitment of Germany to a constitution of human dignity plays a significant
role as well, as it is the obligation of the state to guarantee a certain minimum of
4
material and mental security so that all citizens can realize their potential.
The social justice principle influences a number of other provisions of the Basic
Law. For example, Article 6(1) provides marriage and family rights, stating that
"Marriage and family shall enjoy the special protection of the state." Article 6(2)
provides that "The care and upbringing of children is the natural right of parents
and a duty primarily incumbent upon them. The State shall watch over them in the
performance of this duty." Article 6(4) states that "Every mother shall be entitled to
the protection and care of the community." Article 6(5) provides that "Children
born outside of marriage shall be provided by legislation with the same
opportunities for physical and mental development and for their position in society
as are enjoyed by those born within marriage." Article 7(1) provides that "The
entire school system shall be under the supervision of the state." Article 14(2)
recognizes a communal obligation to property, establishing that "Property entails
obligations. Its use shall also serve the public good."
And Article 15
constitutionalizes the principle of socialization (that is, state control of resources),
should the need arise: "Land, natural resources, and means of production may for
the purpose of socialization be transferred to public ownership or other forms of
public enterprise by a law that determines the nature and extent of compensation."
Such positive state obligations are largely absent from the American constitutional
2 See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

13-17 (1994).

3GRUNDGESETZ (GG - Basic Law/Constitution) art. 20(1), translated by Christian Tomuschat and David
Currie and published by the Press and Information Office of the Federal Republic of Germany. "The
Federal Republic of Germany is a democratic and social federal state."
4 GRUNDGESETZ (GG- Basic Law/Constitution) art. 1(1) ("Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect

and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority.").
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order. 5
Other notable characteristic differences present in the German constitutional order
include the idea of Drittwirkung(third party effect), pursuant to which the values of
the Basic Law radiate out and influence the interpretation of private law. The effect
also can flow in the other direction; private law norms can influence the
interpretation of constitutional norms. This is known as the theory of
Wechselwirkung (reciprocal effect). 6 Under religious freedoms, rights extend to
secular philosophical beliefs as well as faith-based beliefs, and "No person shall be
compelled against his conscience to render military service involving the use of
arms." 7 And, as observed by Currie in his book, "Among the more startling
aspects of the Basic Law to an observer from the other side of the Atlantic is a set of
provisions that appear to embody Milton's view that the enemies of freedom are
not entitled to its blessings." 8 This, of course, is the concept of streitbare Demokratie
(militant democracy) whereby the state and its citizens can take measures to fight
the enemies of democracy. 9 Applying the concept of militant democracy, the
German Constitutional Court has twice banned political parties. 10
Another intriguing aspect of German constitutional law is the Constitutional

5 See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Soc. Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989) (refusing to

recognize any positive obligation of government to intervene to protect the life and well-being of a child
who the state knew was being abused by his father.).
decisive case is Laith (BVerfGE 7, 198 (1957)), which involved a communication rights dispute over
the right of a film director formerly closely associated with the Nazis to show his new films at a
Hamburg film festival. In overturning an injunction prohibiting Ltith from continuing his call for a
boycott of the film, the Court delineated the value order of the GG. "This value-system, which centers
upon human dignity and the free unfolding of the human personality within the social community,
must be looked upon as a fundamental constitutional decision affecting all areas of law, public and
private .... Thus, basic rights obviously influence civil law too." BVerfGE 7, 198 (205). By interpreting
basic rights as establishing an "objective" ordering of values, the Court was stating that those values are
so important that they must exist "objectively" -as an independent force, separate from their specific
manifestation in a concrete legal relationship. So conceived, objective rights form part of the legal order,
the orde public, and thereby possess significance for all legal relationships. For further consideration of
the "Third Party Effect Theory," see Edward J. Eberle, Public Discourse in Contemporary Germany, 47 CASE
W. RES. L. REv. 797, 811-12 (1997); Peter E. Quint, Free Speech and Private Law in German Constitutional
Theory, 48 MD. L. REV. 247, 261 (1989).
6 The

7 GRUNDGESETZ (GG- Basic Law/Constitution) art. 4(1) and 4(3).
8 CURRIE, supra

note 2, at 213.

9 GRUNDGESETZ (GG- Basic Law/Constitution) art. 21(2).
10See BVerfGE 5, 85 (1956) (outlawing the Communist Party); see also BVerfGE 2, 1 (1952) (outlawing the
Socialist Reich Party, successor to the Nazis).
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Court's serious consideration of economic measures, a particular interest of
Currie's.
As he observes, "the Constitutional Court has achieved results
reminiscent of those reached by the Supreme Court during the Lochner period.""
The Constitutional Court judged the reasonableness of economic measures to see if
they passed constitutional muster in a manner not unlike the Supreme Court
during the Lochner period (1905-1936) where it invoked the due process clause to
invalidate state measures 12 and applied a restrictive view of the Commerce Clause
to invalidate federal measures. 13 Under German law, the Constitutional Court has
invoked Article 2 (personality freedoms), Article 3 (equality freedoms), Article 12
(occupational freedoms), and Article 14 (property freedoms) to scrutinize with care
the reasonableness of state measures that affect economic matters along the lines of
14
the Lochner Court.
In this short article commemorating the life and work of David Currie, I will
examine one aspect of the Lochnerian approach of the German Constitutional Court:
the careful scrutiny of economic measures under the equality norms of Article 3.
The article will proceed by laying out the judicial standards the Court applies to
equality and then demonstrating how it applies them to economic measures.
Standard socio-economic measures can be subject to a probing form of review if
they present overt inequalities among similarly situated groups. That is, disparate
treatment of different groups can only be justified by a convincing rationale. If no
such disparity is present, the measure will be presumptively upheld if an evident
reason is present. This is not unlike the low-level deferential standard of review of
rational basis under United States law. So, let us pick up the threads of a piece of
the fine work left by David Currie.

I David P. Currie, LoclinerAbroad: Substantive Due Processand Equal Protection in the Federal Republic of
Germany, 1989 SuP. CT.REV.333, 348. ("Lochner Abroad"). Republished inthis issue of the Gernan Law
Journal.
12 See,

e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).

13See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
14See Currie, supra note 11, at 339-52.
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B. German Equality Norms
The German Basic Law is quite concrete as to what equality means, providing
much textual guidance to the German courts and legislatures, as is typical of post
World War II constitutions. Article 3 of the Basic Law provides:
(1) All persons shall be equal before the law.
(2) Men and women shall have equal rights. The
state shall promote the actual implementation of
equal rights for women and men and take steps to
eliminate disadvantages that now exist.
(3) No person shall be favored or disfavored
because of sex, parentage, race, language,
homeland and origin, faith, or religious or political
opinions. No person shall be disfavored because
of disability. 15
As is apparent from the text of the German charter there are a fairly substantial
number of personal traits demarcated as special equality norms, including gender,
"sex, parentage, race, language, homeland and origin, faith, or religious or political
opinions." All of these traits are immutable, except for those involving language,
faith, religion or political opinion, over which a person can exert control. The wide
number of demarcated personal traits present in the Basic Law contrasts with the
open ended text of the United States Fourteenth Amendment, which provides "No
state shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." As with much of American constitutional jurisprudence, it is up to the
Supreme Court to identify traits it would regard as suspect. So far, despite over 60
years of Supreme Court jurisprudence, American equality jurisprudence recognizes
17
only race or national origin 16 and alienage as suspect classes.
In spite of the difference in the textual foundations with which they have to work,
both Courts employ a sliding scale of judicial scrutiny with the degree of scrutiny
varying with the trait or personal interest affected by the governmental measure.
Strict or extremely intensive scrutiny applies to measures targeting personal traits
1oGRUNDGESETZ (GG- Basic Law/Constitution) art. 3. Much of the discussion on equality is derived from
Edward J. Eberle, Equality in Germany and the United States, San Diego Int'l L. J. (forthcoming).
16See Korematsu v. United States 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
17S e Sugerman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973)(suspect class treatment for alienage status applies only to

state governmental actions, and not federal governmental, and only when state governmental measures
cannot be justified under public function doctrine.).
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that affect especially a person's identity. Again, under U.S. law this includes race,
national heritage or alienage in United States law. Under German law it includes
race, sex, gender, language, national origin, disability or faith, religion and political
opinion in German law.' 8 More deferential judicial review is reserved for matters
involving socio-economic measures with an important difference present in
German law. The German Constitutional Court probes rigorously even matters of a
socio-economic dimension if the law under review affects different groups of
people unequally and no persuasive justification for the disparity is evident. Let us
turn now to examine the Constitutional Court's approach to enforcing the principle
of equality to socio-economic measures.
C. Socio-Economic Measures
In socio-economic matters the level of review varies under German law. First, if the
measure triggers a fundamental right other than equality and/or it results in
disparate treatment of similarly situated groups, the Constitutional Court will
intensify the degree of its scrutiny and sustain the measure only if quite convincing
reasons are present; in essence, this is a form of intensive scrutiny. The closest
parallel in United States equal protection jurisprudence to this heightened form of
review might be the intermediate scrutiny it applies to gender-based
discrimination. With regard to the German context I will refer to it as heightened
review. It is a more rigorous examination of the state's justifications for drawing
distinctions in socio-economic matters than the more standard form of rational
basis review typically applied and pursuant to which the Constitutional Court
probes the inequality resulting from the measure and sustains it if there is a sound
reason to justify the difference. If neither a dramatic inequality exists nor any other
right or group differential is present, the Constitutional Court will sustain the
measure if there is a sound explanation. 19 What these different levels of review
applied to inequalities in socio-economic policy indicate is that the Court varies its
scrutiny based on the degree of inequality present. Even review of socio-economic
matters can be rigorous. We will now turn to an examination and explanation of
the sliding scale variety of review applied to socio-economic matters, starting with
heightened review.

18See GRUNDGESETZ (GG- Basic Law/Constitution) art. 3.
19See the Transsexual It Case (BVerfGE 88, 87 (96-97) (1993)) ("When only the simple prohibition against
arbitrariness (Willkuerverbot) comes into play, a violation of article 3(1) can be established only when the
lack of substantiation of the difference in treatment evident is."). This is generally known as the
arbitrariness or evident standard, meaning that an evident reason must be present to justify the measure.
It is the lowest level of review under German law. Its equivalent in United States law would be rational
basis review.
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The Retirement Benefits Case20 concerned the formula for allocating retirement
benefits between public employees and employees who previously had worked in
the public sector but had then left to work in the private sector. The Court found
the measure unconstitutional because the formula resulted in higher retirement
income for public employees as compared to employees who had moved into the
private sector. Even though this was a socio-economic regulation the Court
nevertheless probed the measure quite intensely based on the unequal treatment of
the two generally similarly situated groups and the implication of the policy for
Article 12 occupational choice freedoms.
Another case involving heightened scrutiny concerned the computation of income
levels of a separated married couple for purposes of obtaining state financial aid for
university education. 21 In the Separated Couple University Aid Case the couple had
been separated for a long time. Under German law the couple's income in such
cases ordinarily is counted separately, not jointly. That was not the case here. The
applicant for state aid was denied a state grant based on the joint income of both
spouses, notwithstanding that they long had been separated. The Constitutional
Court invalidated the provision as a violation of Article 3 equality; the measure
discriminated against a group of people, here separated couples, without a sound
justification. The measure was especially dubious, the Court explained, because
most other aspects of German law gave separate treatment to the incomes of long
separated couples for purposes of qualifying for benefits. This was the case in areas
22
like welfare or unemployment benefits, or salary or tax matters.
Heightened concern with the disparate treatment of essentially similarly situated
groups of people led the Court to declare another socio-economic policy
unconstitutional in the Employee Termination Case.2 3 The case involved disparity in
0 BVerfGE 98, 365 (1998).
21 See

the SeparatedCouple Universityj Aid Case (BVerfGE 91, 389 (1995)). Under German law, citizens are
entitled to state subsidized support for university education when they do not have adequate financial
means to support the costs of university education. The law is known as the federal education support
law or Bundesausbildungsfoerderungsgesetz.The law is part of the social welfare net.
22 See BVerfGE 91, 335 (402-03) (1994). In another case, BVerfGE 99, 165 (1998), involving similar

concerns regarding state funding of university education, the Constitutional Court found it
unconstitutional to deny a student access to state grants for higher education when the student claimed
a status independent of his parents, but the parents' income was nevertheless used as part of the
calcuation to see if the student would qualify for the state grant. In the case, the student was seeking a
second education and, under the formula for calculating benefits, the parents' income was not high
enough to cover the costs of the education. The Court found no justifiable reason for the difference in
treatment of parent dependent and parent independent students. Td. at 178, 181.
" BVerfGE 82, 126 (1990).
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length of notice of termination between physical (or blue collar) and nonphysical or
mentally skilled workers (or white collar). Blue collar workers were entitled to two
weeks' notice of termination; white collar workers received six weeks' notice of
termination. The longer an employee's tenure with an employer the more the
minimum length of notice of termination increased. For blue collar employees, ten
years employment triggered two months' notice of termination and twenty years
employment required three months' notice. For white collar workers, five years
employment triggered three months' notice and ten years employment required
five months' notice.2 4 In the case that reached the Constitutional Court a woman
worked as a tailor in an apparel store for fifteen years. The employer terminated
her employment with eight weeks' notice, the length of termination having been
established by a collective bargaining agreement. Under the collective bargaining
agreement white collar employees employed for fifteen years received six months'
notice.25 Because of the differential in treatment of the two groups of employees
the Court applied, again, heightened scrutiny.
An unequal treatment of several groups under the
same norms is consistent with the general equality
norm of Article 3(1) only when the difference
between the groups can be justified by reasons of
sufficient nature and weight.
Disparity in
treatment and justifiable grounds must stand in a
proportionate relationship to one another. Thereby
also to be considered in the balance is whether the
inequality will have an effect on basic protected
freedoms.26
Perhaps a disparity in treatment might be justified when a "generalization impacts
27
negatively only on a small group of people and the inequality is not very severe."
In this case there was no adequate justification for the disparate treatment. For
example, the idea that white collar workers merit a longer notice of termination
period because they are better educated, having invested more time in building a
career, is simply not sufficient as a basis for the differential in treatment. 28 The
14

Id. at 128-29 (citing BGB § 622).

For coverage of the case, see Susanne Baer, Equality: The Jurisprudence of the German Constitutional Court,
5 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 249, 250 (1998-99).
2,

26

BVerfGE 82, 126 (146) (1990).

27 fd.

at 152.

" Id. at 148-49.
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Court concluded that this justification may have worked in the past but no
longer. 29 The measure affected a large, not small, group of people; hence, it could
not be justified on the second rationale either.
As David Currie observed,
the Constitutional Court has found fault with the
exclusion of unemployment benefits for students
and for persons formerly employed by their
parents, limitations on aid for the blind or
disabled, and the denial of retirement benefits to
persons living abroad. Some of these decisions
may be explainable on the ground that the
classification
impinged
upon
some other
fundamental right; but the overall impression is
that the Constitutional Court is rather strict in
scrutinizing classifications in the distribution of
30
welfare benefits as such.
Currie further observed that matters involving tax law also received heightened
scrutiny from the Court when the law impacts disparately on people.
[C]lassifications made in tax laws require special
justification because of the severity of their impact.
A surprising number of such distinctions have
been found wanting: discriminatory taxation of
chain stores, preferential treatment of vertically
integrated firms under the value-added tax,
nondeductibility of partners' salaries and of childcare expenses, to name only a few. These decisions
stand in sharp contrast to modern decisions in the
United States; the Supreme Court has not
scrutinized classifications in tax laws with much
care since the New Deal Revolution.31

Id. at 153.
30 Currie,

supra note 11, at 369. For citations to the German cases, see id.

3' Currie,

supra note 11, at 368-69. For citations to the German cases, see id.
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Furthermore, Currie noted that "the Constitutional Court has also applied the
general equality clause of Article 3(1) to strike down an impressive variety of
measures."3 2 He went on, remarking that often the Court will invoke substantive
provisions of other rights
to give content to the general prohibition of Article
3(1). Thus, the Court has been quick to condemn
discrimination against married people or families
with children under Article 3(1) in conjunction
with the applicable paragraphs of Article 6. It has
done the same in cases respecting inequalities
affecting the academic and occupational freedoms
guaranteed by Articles 5(3) and 12 (1), the
traditional rights of civil servants under Article
33(5), the right to operate private schools under
Article 7(4), and above all the right to participate in
33
elections.
So, what we see under German equality jurisprudence is that mere economic
matters may merit a more searching scrutiny than simple rational basis when either
the measure impacts disproportionately on two relatively similar groups or when a
fundamental right is impacted. In these cases the Court will uphold the measure
only in the face of a demonstrable, convincing justification for the difference in
treatment. It seems clear that German law possesses a degree of rigor that is more
broadly applied than that of United States law. As Currie observes, "without
intimating that the distinctions either embodied suspect classifications or impinged
upon fundamental rights, for example, the Constitutional Court conjured up
memories of the vigorous way in which the Equal Protection Clause was enforced
34
in economic cases during the Lochner era in this country."
By contrast, when no suspect class trait is involved or when no obvious disparity in
treatment among groups of people is present, the Constitutional Court will apply
the conventional, low-level review of rational basis to ascertain whether the
measure in question is constitutional or not. Even here, however, the Court will
require a convincing reason to justify disparate treatment of groups of people. The
standard of rational basis review, therefore, is somewhat more demanding than the

32ld. at 367.
13

ld. at 367. For citations to the German cases, see id.

14

Id. at 370.

2008]

German Equal Protection

2105

conventional United States approach that calls for, simply, any plausible reason 35 or
36
where "the question is at least debatable."
A few cases will suffice to demonstrate the more rigorous nature of German
rational basis review. In a case involving a pharmacy that wanted to continue
operating in a railroad station, the Constitutional Court found that officials were
justified in shutting down the pharmacy because it dealt in the dispersal of
medicines and, therefore, was subject to more stringent pharmaceutical regulations.
Other businesses that operated in the railroad station were not subject to this
additional regulatory oversight. 37 The Court found this to be a sound reason for
the difference in treatment among the businesses. In a case involving fees for
children attending kindergarten the Constitutional Court ruled that a municipality
38
was justified in applying a sliding scale of fees based on parental income levels.
Income levels were used in other social programs, the Court explained, such as
social welfare benefits or income tax rates; thus, they could also be used for
determining kindergarten fees. 39 In a case involving a 15 year old boy wanted to
soup-up his bicycle by adding a motor so that he could travel as fast as 25
kilometers per hour, the Court determined that it was permissible for authorities to
cite the boy under the criminal law, in contrast to the civil law that handles most
traffic violations, because the boy did not qualify yet for a driver's license, posing
dangers to other moving vehicles and pedestrians. 40 In another case a veterinarian
sued claiming that he was entitled to exemption from being required to testify
under oath on the ground that he, like physicians and lawyers, needed to protect
confidential information acquired in his practice. The Constitutional Court denied
the claim, reasoning that veterinarians simply do not trade in sensitive personal
matters like physicians and lawyers. 41 This made eminent sense, after all, because
veterinarians treat animals, not people. Thus, there are good reasons for the
different treatment of veterinarians as compared to legal and medical
professionals. 42 In yet another case, this time involving the reunification of
3

See, e.g., Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 546 (1972).

36Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co, 449 U.S. 456 (1981) (citing United States v. Carolene Products

Co., 304 U.S. 144, 154 (1938)).
37See BVerfGE 13, 225 (1961).

31See BVerfGE 97, 332 (1998).
39See ld. at 344.
40See BVerfGE 51, 60 (1979).
41See BVerfGE 312 (1975).
41See Id.at 323.
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Germany, the Court ruled that a difference in treatment of the debt burden of a
former East German company as compared to a West German company could be
justified by the difference in economic standards between the then two
43
Germanies.
D. Conclusion
In this short survey of German equality norms as they apply to socio-economic
measures, another difference between the German and American constitutional
orders is revealed. German equality norms play a central role in society. The
Constitutional Court strives to apply the principle of equality uniformly and
consistently to all members of society. What comes to matter is evaluating whether
different people or organizations are treated fairly. While those especially
vulnerable within society get special judicial solicitude, equality matters for all
people, even when it is just a run-of-the-mill socio-economic measure. The Court is
in search of an "egalitarian notion of equality." 44 "For better or worse, the German
Constitutional Court is in the business of determining the reasonableness of
governmental action-and, to a significant degree, of inaction as well." 45 As this
substantive notion of equality impinges upon economic interests, it is, as Currie
observed, a bit reminiscent of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in the Lochner era.
What this means for U.S. constitutional law is a question to be debated. Does the
German Court's approach provide a model for the reintroduction of the Lochner-era
jurisprudence? 46 Perhaps. The German Court's approach has the advantage of
promoting consistency in the application of equality across the board and to all
those affected. This bespeaks a commitment to fundamental fairness in society: All
people should have a fundamental claim to equality. But perhaps not. The Lochnerera jurisprudence focused primarily on the underlying ideology of laissez faire
capitalism, using constitutional doctrines to favor private employers over those
more vulnerable within society. German equality jurisprudence is, in fact, more
concerned with protecting the most vulnerable. 47 But the German law is interested
in the fair treatment of economic actors as well.
43 See BVerfGE 95, 267 (1997).
44William B. Barker, lic Three Faces of Equality: ConstitutionalRequirements in Taxation, 57 CASE W. RES. L.

REV. 1, 49 (2006).
45 Currie, supra note 11, at 371-72 ("More important for us is what the German decisions have to say

about the desirability of empowering politically insulated judges to make open-ended judgments about
the reasonableness of government action. Some may find in the German experience confirmation of the
dangers of unchecked judicial intervention, others proof of the need for broad judicial review.").

47 See Edward J. Eberle, Equality in Germany and the United States (forthcoming 2009).
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Thus we return to the mission of comparative law: evaluating, assessing and
considering different patterns of legal orders, looking beyond our borders, in order
to determine whether a domestic system works or whether it might be improved by
learning lessons from abroad. That debate, of course, is one to be resolved by each
society, often from one generation to another. But that is just what David Currie
would have wanted, as his work continues to inspire us.

2108

GERMAN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 09 No. 12

